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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES CASING SERVICE : 




JERRY L. McKEAN and/or : 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, : 
Supreme Court No. 20508 
Applicant/Respondents.: 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented on appeal is whether an injury the 
applicant sustained while in his home is compensable under the 
Workers' Compensation Act of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 8, 1982, while working for Mountain States 
Casing Service in Coalville, Utah, Jerry L. McKean, the applicant-
respondent herein, caught his right arm in a drilling apparatus. 
The arm was completely severed in the accident. (R. 1-3). 
After impressive surgical intervention, the limb was saved. Six 
or seven subsequent surgeries were required, however, leaving the 
applicant with little or no feeling in the arm. (R. 43, 45, 
67-68, 98). 
The State Insurance Fund paid all medical bills, 
temporary total disability compensation and certain other expenses 
following the accident. (R. 4, 9-12, 58-61, 116-117). 
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i 
On or about April 6f 1932, the applicant seriously 
burned his right hand while engaged in various activities at his 
home, including working on a steam heater, working on headers to 
an automobile exhaust system, and cooking on a stove. (R. 66-67). 
The injury was rather serious because applicant apparently did not 
feel any heat on his hand when it was burned. (R. 31-32, 43, 45, 
117). This burn injury necessitated skin graft surgery. The 
applicant was admitted to the University of Utah Hospital on April 
13, 1982, for the surgery and released on April 19, 1982. (R. 92, 
117) . 
The State Insurance Fund denied liability for treatment 
of the burn injury, contending that the causal connection between 
the burn injury and the earlier industrial injury of January 8, 
1982, was broken. (R. 117). A hearing was held on the matter on 
January 14, 1985. (R. 16-87). 
The Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on January 23, 1985, holding 
that State Insurance Fund was liable for expenses resulting from 
the applicant's burn injury. (R. 98-102). 
A Motion for Review was submitted by State Insurance 
Fund and Mountain States Casing Service, defendant-appellants 
herein, on January 29, 1985. (R. 104-108). On February 6, 1985, 
the Administrative Law Judge's Order was affirmed by the Indus-
trial Commission in its Denial of Motion for Review. (R. 110). 
Appellants submitted a Petition for Review and Docketing 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Statement to this Court on March 4, 1985. (R. 112-133). Appel-
lants now submit their Supreme Court Brief in this matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. McKean's 
burn injury occurred within the so-called "quasi-course of 
employment" and was thus compensable. The doctrine of quasi-
course of employment/ however, is not part of Utah law. In any 
case, McKean's injury does not properly come within the quasi-
course of employment; and, hence, the injury is not compensable on 
that ground. Neither is McKean's injury compensable on the basis 
•I 
of general rules concerning subsequent injuries. The chain of 
causation leading from McKean's original industrial injury was 
broken by his own negligent conduct. 
\ ARGUMENT 
| POINT I 
THE INJURY IN QUESTION WAS NOT THE RESULT OF 
AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND WAS NOT SUSTAINED 
DURING THE "QUASI-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT". 
In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
affirmed by the Industrial Commission, the Administrative Law 
Judge based his conclusion of law on Professor Larson's analysis 
of the "quasi-course of employment". Appellants contend, first, 
that Larson's concept of "quasi-course of employment" is not part 
of Utah law and, second, that the Administrative Law Judge, in any 
event, misapplied Larson's concept in the instant case. 
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No Utah case is cited anywhere in the Administrative Law 
Judge's Findings of Fact or in the Industrial Commission's Denial 
of Motion for Review to suggest that Utah has adopted Professor 
Larson's concept of "quasi-course of emloyment" activities. 
Appellants note that at least a minority of states have rejected 
Larson's concept. According to Larson, activities in the 
so-called "quasi-course of employment" are activities undertaken 
by the employee following an industrial injury that, although they 
occur outside the time and space limits of the employment, "are 
nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are 
necessary or reasonable activities that would not have been 
UndgytaK^n bn£ Z&I ths coflpengabls injury." Larson, Vol. 1, 
Section 13.11(d) (emphasis added). Larson illustrates activities 
in the "quasi-course of employment" with the example of trips to 
and from a physician's office for treatment of the industrial 
injury. Larson, Vol. 1, Section 13.11(d). 
A number of states, however, have disallowed compen-
sation for injuries in such circumstances. In Anderson v. Chatham 
Electronics, 70 N.J. Super. 202, 175 A.2d 256 (1961), the court 
rejected the quasi-course of employment argument. In that case, 
the employee sustained injuries in an auto collision while 
returning from her doctor's office where she had gone for a 
medical clearance slip required by her employer before returning 
to work following surgery unrelated to her employment. The court 
held that those injuries did not "arise out of and in the course 
of the employment." 
4 
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Kiaer v. Idaho Corp., 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963) 
involved an initial work-related injury and a subsequent auto-
mobile accident which aggravated the first injury. The auto 
accident occurred on a day when the claimant was not working for 
her employer, but while she was enroute to a doctor for treatment 
of injuries sustained in the industrial accident. The Idaho 
Supreme Court found the auto accident did not arise out of and in 
the course of claimant's employment, because there was no causal 
connection between the industrial injury and the accident. 
Following Farmers Gin Co, V, Cpopqr# 147 Okl. 29, 294 P. 108 
(1930), the Idaho Court found the highway collision to be an 
intervening cause breaking the causal connection between the 
injury and the employment. 
The court in Bankers Investment Co. v. Boyd, Okl., 560 
P.2d 958 (1977) came to a similar conclusion. In that case, the 
claimant was traveling to a hospital for treatment of a prior 
industrial injury when she was involved in an automobile acci-
dent. Since the auto accident occurred six months after the 
claimant's termination of employment, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
held that the resulting injuries neither arose out of nor occurred 
in the course of employment and were, therefore, not compensable. 
Even if Utah, in an appropriate case, would adopt 
Professor Larson's concept of quasi-course activities, the concept 
does not apply in the instant case. The Administrative Law Judge 
misapplied the concept in his Findings of Fact. The Adminis-
trative Law Judge cited the following passage from Larson, in 
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which Larson explains his concept of the quasi-course of employ-
ment: 
. . . activities undertaken by the employee 
following upon his injury which, although they 
take place outside the time and space limits 
of the employment, and would not be considered 
employment activities for usual purposes, are 
nevertheless related to the employment in the 
sense that they are necessary QC reasonable 
activities that WQU14 HQt hafyg been qn<tertaken 
bgt fop the QQinpensafrlg injmry. Larson, 
Vol, 1, Section 13.11(d); R. 99 (emphasis 
added). 
Prom this passage, the Administrative Law Judge inferred that any 
necessary or reasonable activities would be included in Larson's 
quasi-course of employment. Accordingly, the Administrative Law 
Judge found that HcKean's activities on the day of his injury 
(working on an exhaust header, working on a steam radiator, 
cooking on a stove) were entirely reasonable. The Administrative 
Law Judge stated: 
Applying the foregoing to the instant matter, 
the question becomes: was the applicant's 
conduct on or about April 6, 1982 reasonable 
such that his activities may be considered 
reasonable or necessary. Considering all of 
the circumstances of the case, I do not find 
it unreasonable that the applicant would have 
been working on his car on April 6, 1982 nor 
do I find the applicant's conduct unreasonable 
in preparing his meals, since he and his wife 
were separated at that time. Finally, I do 
not see anything unreasonable about the 
applicant attempting to repair an inoperative 
steam radiator for the purpose of having heat 
in the home. Rather, each of these activities 
are [sic] reasonable, usual daily activities 
of living. (R. 100). 
It is clear fiom this passage that the Administrative 
Law Judae misconstrued Larson's concept of quasi-course of 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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employment. Larson does not speak of activities which are 
"necessary or reasonable" simplicitor. Larson says, " . . . neces-
sary or reasonable activities that would not have been undertaken 
but for the compensable injury." Larson goes on to state, 
"'Reasonable' at this point relates not to the method used, but to 
the category of activity itself." Larson, Vol. 1, Section 
13.11(d). When Larson speaks of "necessary or reasonable acti-
vities", he has in mind those activities that are necessitated by 
the employee's original industrial injury. This is made clear by 
the examples he gives, such as the example of trips to and from a 
physician's office for treatment of the industrial injury.1 
Larson, Vol. 1, Section 13.11(d). Activities of this kind, of 
course, are necessitated (i.e., made necessary and reasonable) by 
the employee's injury. In contrast, the activities undertaken by 
Mr. McKean on April 6, 1982, were not necessitated by his original 
industrial injury. McKean's activities were entirely unrelated to 
his original injury. As the Administrative Law Judge correctly 
noted, each of McKean's activities was a normal activity of daily 
living. (R. 100). Consequently, Mr. McKean's activities were not 
activities within the quasi-course of employment; and, accord-
xCases exemplifying quasi-course of employment activities, in 
addition to those cited in Larson, are: Wood v. State 
Ace. Ins. Fund, 30 Or. App. 1103, 569 P.2d 648 (1977) (Injury 
sustained during vocational rehabilitation program designed to 
restore employee to full employability after initial on-the-job 
injury was itself compensable); Whitington v. Indus. Com'n, 10 
Ariz. App. 461, 459 P.2d 740 (1969) (Compensation paid on 
auto-accident injury which occurred while employee was driving to 
attend medical consultation concerning his earlier industrial 
accident). 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i n g l y , t h e b u r n i n j u r y r e s u l t i n g from one o r more of t h o s e 
a c t i v i t i e s i s no t compensable. 
POINT I I 
THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION LEADING PROM THE 
ORIGINAL INDUSTRIAL INJURY WAS BROKEN BY THE 
APPLICANT'S OWN NEGLIGENT CONDUCT. 
The g e n e r a l r u l e r e g a r d i n g t h e c o m p e n s a b i l i t y of 
i n j u r i e s subsequent t o an o r i g i n a l i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y i s s t a t e d by 
P r o f e s s o r Larson as f o l l o w s : 
The b a s i c r u l e i s t h a t a s u b s e q u e n t 
i n j u r y , whether an a g g r a v a t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l 
i n j u r y o r a new and d i s t i n c t i n j u r y , i s 
c o m p e n s a b l e i f i t i s t h e d i r e c t and n a t u r a l 
r e s u l t of a c o m p e n s a b l e p r i m a r y i n j u r y . 
Larson , Vol . 1, Sec t ion 1 3 . 1 1 . 
As noted a t Po in t I , Larson d i s t i n g u i s h e s a c t i v i t i e s in 
t h e q u a s i - c o u r s e of employment; and Larson m a i n t a i n s t h a t , wi th 
r e g a r d t o s u c h a c t i v i t i e s , o n l y i n t e n t i o n a l c o n d u c t by t h e 
employee w i l l b r e a k t h e c h a i n of c a u s a t i o n . L a r s o n , V o l . 1 , 
S e c t i o n 1 3 . 1 1 ( d ) . With r e g a r d t o n o n - q u a s i - c o u r s e a c t i v i t i e s , 
however, t he employee ' s neg l i gence i s enough t o break t h e cha in of 
c a u s a t i o n . About such n o n - q u a s i - c o u r s e a c t i v i t i e s , Larson w r i t e s : 
When, however , t he i n j u r y fo l lowing t h e 
i n i t i a l compensable i n j u r y does no t a r i s e out 
of a q u a s i - c o u r s e a c t i v i t y r . . . , t h e cha in 
of c a u s a t i o n may be deemed broken by e i t h e r 
intentional QC negligent claimant miscgn^ugt. 
L a r s o n , V o l . 1 , S e c t i o n 1 3 . 1 1 ( d ) , 3-380 
(emphasis added). 
The i n s t a n t case f a l l s w i t h i n t he c a t e g o r y of cases 
P r o f e s s o r Larson has c o l l e c t e d under t h e heading of "Weakened 
member c o n t r i b u t i n g to l a t e r f a l l or o t h e r i n j u r y " . Larson, 
8 
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Vol, 1, Section 13.12. Larson cites cases both allowing and 
disallowing compensation. The operative distinction between the 
cases is whether or not the claimant was negligent. In one case, 
for instancef the claimant/ because of a compensable eye injury, 
was required to wear dark glasses. At 11:00 at nightf in his own 
homef he fell down the stairs because of the obscuring of his 
vision by the glasses. The aggravation of his eye condition 
resulting from the fall was held compensable. The claimant in the 
case was not found to have been negligent/ however. Randolph 
V, Bt J. Du PQnt D<* Nerooyirg CP,, 130 N.J.L. 353/ 33 A#2d 301 
(1943). A contrary result was arrived at in Sullivan v. 3. & 
A. Constr, , Inc. , 122 N.Y.S.2d 571, rev'g 307 N.Y. 161/ 120 N.E.2d 
694 (1954) . In this case, the claimant was found to have been 
negligent. The claimant had previously suffered two compensable 
knee injuries; and/ as a result of these accidents, his right knee 
occasionally "locked"/ rendering the right leg practically 
useless. While driving an automobile/ his right knee locked; he 
was unable to apply his brakes; and an accident occurred. The 
injuries sustained in the automobile accident were held noncompen-
sable/ on the ground that claimant's own act of driving with 
knowledge of his condition broke the chain of causation between 
the industrial accident and the car crash. Appellants contend 
that the instant case is much more like Sullivan than Randolph. 
Appellants contend that Mr. McKean was negligent when he engaged 
in the activities of April 6, 1982, without taking any precautions 
against burning his hand. 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
Utah cases are consistent with the categories and 
distinctions set out by Professor Larson. The implication that i 
negligence will cut off the chain of causation is found in 
Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Indus, Com'n of Utah, Utah, 275 P. 777 
(1929). In that case, an employee injured his back while on the < 
job. He went to a doctor who misdiagnosed his condition as 
rheumatism and advised the employee to have all his teeth 
extracted. Following the physician's orders, the employee had his { 
teeth extracted. He then sought compensation for these expenses. 
Holding that the additional expenses were compensable, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
So, though it be assumed that the physician 
who diagnosed the employee's condition as that 
of rheumatism was . . . incompetent, and that 
in consequence thereof the employee's teeth 
were extracted, yet, inasmuch as no claim is 
..made that the employee was negligent in 
seeking or employing such physician, the 
aggravated . . . condition of the employee so 
occasioned by the . . . unskillfulness of such 
physician cannot be said to be due to an 
independent and intervening cause. . . . 257 
P. at 779 (emphasis added). 
Two relatively recent Utah cases held the applicant's 
subsequent injury to be compensable. In Fruehauf Trailer 
Co. v. Indus, Com'n, 16 Utah.2d 95, 396 P.2d 409 (1964), the 
applicant injured his knee while working and developed thrombo-
phlebitis as a result. Later, he developed a gall bladder condi-
tion and pulmonary embolus. The Utah Supreme Court found that 
there was sufficient evidence of a causal relationship between the 
previous, industrial injury and the pulmonary embolus to uphold 
the reward of compensation. In Fruehauf, there was no question of 
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the applicant's subsequent medical problems being brought about by 
any negligence on his part. Likewise, there was no issue of the 
applicant's negligence in Perchelli v. Utah State Indus. Com'n, 25 
Utah 2d 58, 475 P.2d 835 (1970). In that case, the applicant had 
injured his back in an industrial injury. Some years later, his 
condition was triggered by a sneeze into a disc herniation, which 
required surgery. The medical evidence was that the applicant had 
a progressive back condition due to the work-related injury and 
that if the claimant had not sneezed, some other major or minor 
event would have eventually necessitated the surgery. 
In his commentary on the case, Larson holds that the 
result in Perchelli is "clearly correct." Larson points out that 
the sneezing incident should not obscure the true nature of the 
case, which is merely the further medical complication flowing 
from a compensable injury. Larson notes that if the herniation 
had occurred while the applicant rolled over in his sleep, its 
characterization as a natural sequel to the compensable injury 
would have seemed obvious. Finally, Larson distinguishes the case 
from one involving negligence by the applicant: 
A different question is presented, of course, 
when the triggering activity is itself rash in 
the light of claimant's knowledge of his 
condition. Larson, Vol. 1, Section 13.11(a). 
Appellants contend that the instant case is easily 
distinguishable from Fruehauf and Perchelli in that applicant 
McKean was negligent in not protecting his right arm and hand 
during his activities of April 6, 1982. 
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I 
In his Findings of Fact, the Administrative Lav/ Judge 
placed great weight on the fact that Mr. McKeanfs physician told i 
him that some feeling should return to his right arm and hand. 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that McKean was not 
negligent in working with hot objects (exhaust headers, steam i 
radiator, stove), because he did not know his arm was without 
feeling. The Administrative Law Judge stated: 
Based on his lack of prior knowledge, the i 
applicant's activities of the date in ques-
tion, April 6, 1982 do not appear to the 
Administrative Law Judge to have been unrea-
sonable in light of all the facts and circum-
stances. Therefore, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds that the chain of causation ' 
between the industrial injury of January 8, 
1982 and the burn injury sustained by the 
applicant on or about April 6, 1982 has not 
been broken by any intentional or negligent 
misconduct by the applicant. (R. 100). 
Regardless of what Mr. McKean's physician told him he 
might expect about recovering some feeling in his arm, it is 
impossible to believe that Mr. McKean did not know, of his own 
immediate experience, whether he had feeling in his arm at the 
time of his activities of April 6, 1982. Indeed, from McKeanfs 
testimony, it is perfectly clear that he did know that his arm was 
numb. (R. 45, 67-68). 
Although Mr. McKean did and should have undertaken 
activities of daily living, his conduct of those activities should 
not have been negligent. Since he was experiencing numbness in 
his right arm and hand, he should have taken reasonable precau-
tions against further injury. The fact that McKean burned his 
hand and was never aware of the burning when it occurred, shows 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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negligence zg£ ipsa loquitur. At the very least, Mr. McKean 
should have protected his hand while working with hot objects with 
some sort of protective covering, such as a heat-resistant glove. 
Mr. McKean's burn injury was a result of his own 
negligent conduct. This negligence broke the chain of causation 
between the original industrial accident of January 8, 1982, and 
the burn injury of April 6, 1982. As such, neither Mr. McKean's 
employer nor State Insurance Fund should be held liable for the 
expenses incurred by Mr. McKean for the treatment of the burn 
injury to his right hand. 
CQNCLqglQN 
Mr. McKean's subsequent burn injury does not come within 
Professor Larson's quasi-course of employment. Furthermore, the 
chain of causation from McKean's original industrial injury was 
cut off by McKean's own negligent conduct. Accordingly, appel-
lants request that the Industrial Commission's Denial of Motion 
for Review, ordering compensation for McKean's burn injury, be 
reversed. 
DATED this day of April, 1985. 
BLACK & MOORE 
l^^^^^A-^-^-^^--
^-^MARY A. RUDOLPH | r 
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MOUNTAIN STATES CASING SERVICE 
and/or STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 





Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 1A, 1985, at 
10:00 o'clock a.m.; same being pursuant through order and 
notice of the Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
Applicant was present and represented by Chris Nichols, 
Attorney at Law. 
Defendants were represented by Dennis V. Lloyd, Attorney at 
Law. 
At conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the State Insurance Fund, 
by and through counsel, made a motion to dismiss the applicants claim for 
medical expenses incurred as the result of the surgery he received on April 
13, 1982, for a burn received while at home. In addition, the State Insurance 
Fund also made a motion for the allowance of an offset against the applicants 
temporary total disability benefits, for sums received in lieu of payment for 
janitorial services. The motions were taken under advise by the 
Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, the 
Administrative Law Judge is prepared'to enter the following. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
This case involves the tragic amputation of the arm of the applicant, 
Jerry McKean. This industrial injury was sustained on January 8, 1982 while 
the applicant was working for Mountain States Casing in Coalville, Utah. As a 
result of his injury, the applicants arm was caught in the tongs of the 
drilling apparatus, and was amputated. After gallant surgical intervention, 
the limb was saved, however the applicant has had six or seven surgeries to 
the arm as a result. The State Insurance Fund, to its credit, has paid the 
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applicant all temporary total disability benefits which have been indicated 
to date. However, the dispute causing the need for a hearing, revolves around 
the applicants injury he sustained while at home in Shoshone, Idaho on or 
about April 6, 1982. On that date, the applicant was at home and had worked 
on his car installing an exhaust header. That day he also worked on a steam 
radiator in his house which was not working. The applicant also testified 
that he had cooked his meals that day. When the applicant had a bath that 
evening he noticed no problems with his hand, but the following morning he had 
a blister on his right thumb. The applicant testified that since the injury, 
he has been suffering from diminished sensation in his right hand, but that he 
had been told by his doctor that the feeling should come back, and that if it 
did not surgery would be undertaken towards that end. However, the applicant 
was not told to restrict his activities of living. 
Following the discovery of the blister on his thumb, the applicant 
reported for medical treatment to Dr. Leonard, and at that time was advised 
that he would need surgery or else he would possibly lose half of his hand. 
The applicant was admitted to the University of Utah Hospital on April 13, 
1982 for skin graft surgery, and was eventually released on April 19, 1982. 
The State Insurance Fund has denied liability for this treatment, contending 
that the causal connection between that injury and the industrial injury of 
January 8f 1982 was broken. As support for their position, the State 
Insurance Fund relies on Professor Larsen1s Workmen* s Compensation. In 
section 13.00 of the same, Professor Larsen sets forth the general 
considerations governing cases involving the "range of compensable 
consequences0: 
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of 
or in the course of employment, every natural consequence 
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the 
employment, unless it is the result of independent 
intervening cause attributable to claimant's own 
intentional conduct. 
In further talking about this area, Professor Larsen has contrived a 
new concept, which he calls "Quasi-Course of Employment." In this regard, the 
expression means: 
activities undertaken by the employee following upon his 
injury which, although they take place outside the time 
and space limits of the employment, and would not be 
considered employment activities for usual purposes, 
are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense 
that they are necessary or reasonable activities that 
would not have been undertaken but for the compensable 
injury. 
In other words, when an injury arises out of Quasi-Course activity, the 
causal chain is not broken by mere negligence of the applicant in the 
performance of that activity, but rather is only broken by the intentional 
conduct of the applicant which might be regarded as expressly or impliedly 
prohibited by the employer. 
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Applying the forgoing to the instant matter, the question becomes: was the 
applicant's conduct on or about April 6, 1982 reasonable such that his 
activities may be considered reasonable or necessary. Considering all of the 
circumstances of the case, I do not find it unreasonable that the applicant 
would have been working on his car on April 6, 1982 nor do I find the 
applicant's conduct unreasonable in preparing his meals, since he and his wife 
were separated at that time. Finally, I do not see anything unreasonable 
about the applicant attempting to repair an inoperative steam radiator for the 
purpose of having heat in the home. Rather, each of these activities are 
reasonable, usual daily activities of living. 
Had the applicant burned his hand prior to the injury of April 6, 
1982 then, the State Insurance Fund's point would be well taken and his case 
would be analogous to those cited by Professor Larsen. For example, one of 
the cases cited by Professor Larsen involves a claimant who knew he had a 
history of an unstable knee. Possessed of this knowledge, this claimant 
proceeded to climb down a flight of stairs to take out the trash, whereupon an 
injury was sustained. Compensation in that instance was denied, and properly 
so. However, the evidence in the file before me does not inescapably point to 
that conclusion or result. Rather, the applicant testified that his doctor 
had advised him that his feeling would come back in the arm, and the applicant 
testified that he did in fact have some feeling in the arm. Based on his lack 
of prior knowledge, the applicant's activities of the date in question, April 
6, 1982 do not appear to the Administrative Law Judge to have been 
unreasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances. Therefore, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds that the chain of causation between the 
i industrial injury January 8, 1982 and the burn injury sustained by the 
".•*" applicant on or about April 6, 1982 has not been broken by any intentional or 
7'.. • negligent misconduct by the applicant. Rather, his injury of April 6, 1982 is 




y % \ The defendants, by and through counsel, also made a motion for an 
j, .,\ offset of the value of the rental fee of the applicant's present living 
>'<', quarters has against their liability for temporary total disability. The 
' \; applicant testified that he was staying in a downstairs apartment of a 
•i' ' t o * < 
. $/\> building which has been converted to professional offices. The applicant's 
WJ*V testimony was that his wife works five days a week at the job of cleaning 
tV,;- these offices, and that he works two days per week, which consists of emptying 
,;:-.^-' the trash. In addition the applicant is also required to contribute a $50.00 
r^ per month improvement to the apartment. Based on the applicant's testimony, 
r and considering the equities of the case, including the fact that the 
,'I* V applicant is planning on returning to his home in Yakima, Washington, the 
^]\ Administrative Law Judge finds that there is insufficient evidence to grant 
••{;' the relief sought by the State Insurance Fund. Based on the applicant's 
; J'V testmony, it would appear to the Administrative Law Judge that the bulk of the 
4't\ work is being done by his wife such that an offset of the applicant temporary 
total disability benefits would not be proper. r," 
\t' At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the State Insurance 
; Fund, by and through counsel, indicated its willingness to pay the applicant 
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travel reimbursement for seven trips to Salt Lake City from Yakima, 
Washington, payable at the rate of 16i per mile and based on the mileage as 
indicated in the road atlas. The State Insurance Fund has also agreed to pay 
the applicant's future medical expenses for his treatments in Washington, 
subject to the Utah Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule. The Administrative Law 
Judge fully explained the manifestations of this situation to the applicant, 
so that there would be no misunderstanding in this regard. The State 
Insurance Fund also agreed to pay the applicant for five nights of per diem at 
$22.50 per night as reimbursement for trips he made from Yakima, Washington to 
Salt Lake City which involved overnight stays. 
* „ ' • • • . * 
I \ Finally, the applicant produced a W2 form for 1981 which he testified 
i,» , covered wages for the period November 24, 1981 to and including the end of the 
,.,, year. Based on that W2 statement, the applicant was earning wages sufficient 
«'V to entitle him to the maximum award for temporary total disability benefits of 
V \. $256.00 per week. The State Insurance Fund has heretofore paid the applicant 
- s temporary total compensation at the rate of $248.00 per week, thereby creating 
'< *: an $8.00 per week underpayment. The State Insurance Fund is to make the 
necessary adjustments to the applicant's compensation rate, and the difference 




CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
-;. Jerry McKean is entitled to workmen's compensation benefits for the 
fe ; industrial accident sustained on January 8, 1982, which accident arose out of 
™ ; •"' or during the course his scope of his employment with the defendants, Mountain 
] •]' States Casing. 
ORDER: 
: • • ! * 
"',?/'< IT IS THEREFORE ORDER THAT defendants, Mountain states Casing and or 
$\l] State Insurance Fund, pay Jerry McKean compensation at the rate of $256.00 per 
"C^ 'v w e e k f o r temporary total disability benefits, said benefits to continue until 
'. ""• the applicant's condition stabilizes. Since the applicant has heretofore been 
'<«; \ paid temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $248.00 per week, 
; there has been an $8.00 per week underpayment of benefits, which should be 
-;•- paid to the applicant in a lump sum. 
:
' ' IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, Mountain States Casing and or 
State Insurance Fund, pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the 
*:v . , industrial injury of January 8, 1982; said expenses to be paid in accordance 
J'j3J "» with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of the Industrial Commission of 
V-' Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mountain States Casing and 
or State Insurance Fund, pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of 
;;;.\ the injury of or about April 6, 1982, said expenses to be paid in accordance 
'!•.•'• with Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
'U^ • 
^ . * IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mountain States Casing and 
P • ". or State Insurance Fund, pay applicant mileage at the rate of 16^ per mile for 
'ff, • 
t * * 
V* 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
PAGE FIVE 
seven round trips between Yakima, Washington and Salt Lake City; and in 
addition the State Insurance Fund shall also pay five days of per diem at the 
rate of $22.50 per day to the applicant. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mountain States Casing and 
or the State Insurance Fund, pay Chris Nichols, attorney for the applicant, 
15% of the foregoing underpayment of temporary total compensation, travel 
allowance, and per diem allowance, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid 
awards and remitted directly to his office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the offset of temporary total disability 
sought by the State Insurance Fund should be, and the same is hereby denied. 
IS-
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
Vi «i- _day of January, 1985 
i v . ATTEST 
/s/ Linda J. Strasburg 
*f Linda J. Strasburg 
<.; Commission Secretary 




• * 4 •'*• 
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I certify that on January A^t) , 1985 a copy of the 
attached Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law was mailed to the following 
persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Jerry McKean, 731 East South Temple downstairs apartment, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102 
Chris Nichols, Attorney, 142 East 200 South //300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 
State Insurance Fund, Dennis Lloyd, Attorney 560 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Barbara 
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MOUNTAIN STATES CASING SERVICES * 






MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
j 
On or about January 23, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about January 29, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Defendants by and through their attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of January 23, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
7# 
_day of February, 1985. A< 
ATTEST: 
.inda J. ^ Strasburg / 7 
Commission Secretary 
^iWlllllr 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Walter T. Axelgard 
Commissioner 
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Jerry McKean, 731 East South Temple, Downstairs Apartment, SLC, 
UT 84102 
Chris Nichols, Atty., 142 East 200 South, //300, SLC, UT 84111 
Dennis Lloyd, Atty,, State Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 East, 
SLC, UT 84111 
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